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EDITORIAL SECTION
THE RESPONSIBILITIES OF OUR LAW SCHOOLS TO THE
PUBLIC AND THE PROFESSION*
It is a great day in the history of a state when it dedicates a new
law school building. Such a dedication constitutes a reaffirmation
of its belief in the indispensable place of law in our civilization.
Civilizations have existed for centuries with but rudimentary science
and the crudest of arts, but what civilization has ever survived with-
out an adequate system of law? Especially important is the law in
a civilization that prides itself on the high degree of individual liberty
-intellectual, religious, political and economic -that has character-
ized ours from its earliest days. Among us the dedication of a law
school is the dearest recognition that a state can give that it believes,
first, that the law is the mainstay of individual liberty, and second,
that the law must be systematically and scientifically taught by ex-
perienced and learned teachers, if the ideals of personal freedom
which we have as a nation cherished over the centuries are to be pre-
served in an era of confused thinking and of violent action unparal-
leled in the world's history.
As we dedicate this splendid structure that the State of South Caro-
lina has wisely devoted to the law and to its lawyers, present and
prospective, I should like to pose two questions: What of legal
education today? And what of the law today? Then to draw from
the answers to these two questions certain conclusions as to the func-
tions of a modern American law school.
The law school of today is the intellectual descendent of the law
schools of yesterday. In 1779, with Valley Forge still a bitter mem-
ory, with the surrender of Cornwallis at Yorktown two years in the
future, Thomas Jefferson, then Governor of Virginia, nevertheless
thought that the establishment at the College of William and Mary
of a professorship of law and police could no longer be postponed,
and he accordingly persuaded his old friend and preceptor, Chancellor
George Wythe, to accept the appointment. Patriot, signer of the
Declaration of Independence, later a member of the Constitutional
Convention, learned alike in the English law and in ancient and Eliza-
bethan literature, and given to quoting them all in his opinions, George
Wythe was a character of singular purity, simplicity and professional
attainment. The acidulous John Randolph of Roanoke, never given
to superfluous praise, characterized him as the incarnation of justice.
American teachers of law may well be proud to trace their professional
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lineage to him and they may well be a little envious of his students,
among whom was numbered none other than John Marshall himself.
But despite Governor Jefferson's clear insight as to the desirability
of teaching law as part of a broad program of higher education, the
first American law school to achieve a degree of continuity was that
founded in 1784 by Judge Tapping Reeve in the little town of Litch-
field, Connecticut. It was attended by students from all over the
country, including the great Calhoun of South Carolina. There the
law was systematically taught through daily lectures with a thorough-
going quiz every Saturday by Judge Reeve and his.associates. Al-
though the lecture system left much to be desired, the students of
the school did acquire a much better training in the law as a system
than was possible for a law clerk to obtain through the haphazard
guidance of an ordinary practitioner. By 1833, however, advancing
years, political quarrels and the advent of Mr. Justice Story at Har-
vard had combined to close the doors of the Litchfield Law School,
but not until it had sent forth over a thousand graduates.
The name of Joseph Story will be found on any list of the ten
greatest American judges. His service to legal education is no less
important than his work as a justice of the Supreme Court of the
United States and the many great legal works of which he was the
author. His inaugural address as the Dane Professor of Law at Har-
vard in 1829 shows his magnificent concept of law as a subject of
higher education. The spirit with which he approached the study
and the teaching of the law is epitomized in his remarks to the stu-
dents in his moot court:
Gentlemen, this is the High Court of Errors and Appeals from
all other courts in the world. Tell me not of the last cited case
having overruled any great principle -not at all. Give me the
principle, even if you find it laid down in the Institutes of
Hindu Law.
But even Story, great as he was, was unable to accomplish all that
he had dreamed of in legal education. It remained for President
Charles W. Eliot of Harvard, the great educational innovator of
the nineteenth century, to make the seemingly rash experiment in
1870 of appointing to the deanship of the then moribund Harvard
Law School Christopher Columbus Langdell, a legal recluse of the
New York bar, who promptly introduced the methods of modern
science into university legal education by setting his students to
studying the reported cases rather than what some textwriter had
to say about the cases. Langdell believed that the law was a science,
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that the number of legal principles was relatively few and that these
principles were to be derived by the law students themselves from
the decisions of the courts rather than from secondary authority of
the textwriters. He and his successors came to place the primary
emphasis on the acquisition by their students of the art of legal
reasoning from a study of the methods used by judges in the decision
of actual cases. Legal knowledge was, of course, important, but it
was deemed distinctly secondary to the art of legal reasoning. Lang-
delI's methods were slow in winning acceptance even at Harvard,
but over a half century they have prevailed throughout the country
with results known to the entire educational world. With all of the
shortcomings of our modern law schools - and they are many -
everyone will admit that nowhere -In our universities is better teach-
ing being done than in our law schools, and any critique of the law
schools of today must always be made in the light of that great accom-
plishment. Our law schools do teach young men to think.
What, then, are the shortcomings of our law schools, not of any
one law school but of our law schools as a whole? First of all, we
have neglected international law. I think it is safe to say that not
one lawyer in five hundred, possibly not one lawyer in a thousand,
has ever even had a course in international law, not to mention not
being a master of the subject- and this at a time when international
relations and foreign affairs are matters of supreme importance to
the welfare of our country, yes, and to every one of us individually.
And yet this was not always so, as you may see by looking at the
opening chapters of Kent's Commentaries which with Blackstone's
Commentaries constituted the basis of the legal education of our
professional forebears. Indeed, as you will note from the same
source, they were quite as familiar with the civil law that governs
on the Continent of Europe and in all of South and Central America
as they were with the common law. For decades after the American
Revolution French and Dutch authorities on the civil law were fa-
miliarly quoted in the courts of all of our states, especially in com-
mercial cases. Is it less important today that we be familiar with
the institutes of the nations to the south of us and on the Continent
of Europe than it was 175 years ago when our commerce and inter-
course with them were relatively slight? Even less excusable is our
neglect of public law generally in favor of private law. Most law
schools give only attenuated courses in constitutional law; municipal
corporations is a neglected topic; and taxation was quite untaught
until the Sixteenth Amendment inevitably made it a "bread and butter
course", because taxes became a major problem in every private
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transaction. The interrelationship between the study of law and of
government which was proclaimed in Chancellor Wythe's professor-
ship of Law and Police at William and Mary and which characterized
the teaching of Chancellor Kent at Columbia, of Justice Wilson at
Pennsylvania, of Judge Story at Harvard and of Judge Cooley at
Michigan, to number only a few of the highest stars in the galaxy
of great teachers of public law, has been lost to sight in the law
schools, and the teaching of public law has passed by default, in the
main, to the political scientists, as if it were really possible to teach
public law without private law on the one side and government on
the other. We have truncated the course in criminal law and criminal
procedure-where criminal procedure is taught at all- to an ab-
breviated first-year course, as if all of our civil rights did not de-
pend in the ultimate analysis on the enforcement of the criminal law.
This we have let go on at a time when the Director of the Federal
Bureau of Investigation tells us that organized crime is more ram-
pant than it was after World War I and in the prohibition era and
when the American Municipal Association, an organization of muni-
cipal officials throughout the country, has petitioned Congress to
investigate the taking over of local government by organized gang-
sters and when Congress has appropriated a large sum of money to
make such an investigation.
Again, in our preoccupation with the topics of private substantive
law that serve our commercial civilization we have neglected almost
entirely the field of judicial procedure and the administration of
justice in our courts, notwithstanding the fact that an impartial na-
tionwide survey reveals our startling deficiencies in the selection of
both judges and jurors, in our methods, or rather our lack of methods,
of judicial administration and in our procedure and trial practice,
not to mention what goes on in many states in our local criminal and
traffic courts, with politically appointed police judges in the cities
and fee-collecting justices of the peace in the rural areas. Even in
the study of private law we have emphasized judicial decisions at
the expense of statutes, which really are much more troublesome to
handle, and of the administrative regulations and rulings which, like
them or not, constitute the outstanding legal development of the
twentieth century. We still persist in teaching even private law as
a set of technical rules, quite apart from their economic, political
and social background with which there must be sooner or later a
reconciliation. We teach our law, moreover, not as a system as they
did in the early American law schools, and as Blackstone and Kent
present it, but as a series of unintegrated courses, forgetting the wis-
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dom of Maitland's comment that the law is a seamless garment.
Even in the subjects that we do teach, how often do we teach the
casebook through?
And finally, in spite of our preoccupation on the What and the
Why of the law, must we not begin to teach our students the How
of it all? Too long have we failed to see what is going on in our
medical, engineering and business schools in teaching both science
and practice. Too long have we let the splendid teaching of the art
of legal reasoning cover our obvious deficiencies. True, we are not
altogether to blame, for we will teach whatever the Supreme Court
through the bar examiners tells us we must to prepare our students
for the bar examinations. But have we not owed an obligation to
our students and to the bar and to society in general to have suggested
long since to the powers that be that the scope of the bar examinations
should be enlarged to meet the realities of the twentieth century?
There is no novelty in what I have been saying about our law schools.
Others have said as much and more on many occasions. In fact, I
said much more than I have here at the annual convention of the
Association of American Law Schools and I said it more vehemently
and my remarks were received with much applause -but nothing or
very little happens. Perhaps the study of the law schools now being
made by the Survey of the Legal Profession may pry us off dead
center.
So much for legal education today. Where do we find ourselves
in the law? What of the lawyer of today? Where Coke and Bacon
had to deal with 5,000 printed decisions, and Mansfield and Hard-
wicke, Kent and Story, with 10,000, we have to cope with 2,000,000.
The statutes for the last year that I calculated them ran over 46,000
pages. There is no one who can even hazard a guess at the bulk of
our administrative regulations and rulings, for most of them are not
even printed. With the aid of the digests we can and do find our
way around among the decisions, but when it comes to statutes it is
next to impossible to learn how a given problem is being handled in
all of the 48 states; we simply do not have the necessary mechanical
apparatus. We do not even have available a digest of all of the de-
cisions interpreting all of the clauses and phrases of our various
state constitutions. Our written law is a labyrinth and a nightmare,
and yet who can gainsay the fact that it is constantly growing in im-
portance? Think, too, of the bulky ordinance books of the many muni-
cipalities that you and I are supposed to know something about but
of which we are quite oblivious as we drive our automobiles through
town after town trusting to St. Ives to save us from the violation
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of local laws quite unknown to us. All of this law is at least pub-
lished in some form or other. But what would you do if a client
came to you with this simple proposition? He wants to start a busi-
ness in every state of the Union that depends upon the statutes and
the administrative rulings and regulations in a certain field in each
state. He desires you to assemble all of the applicable law for him.
Of course, you could give him the statute law of your own state.
For the statutes of the other states you would probably feel that it
would be risky to do otherwise than enlist the aid of some lawyer in
each jurisdiction. As to the administrative regulations and rulings
in your own state, assuming that they have not been published as
generally they are not, you would doubtless wish to consult some
expert at the State Capitol, if after due inquiry you can locate one.
Similarly in each state you would have to consult not any mere mem-
ber of the bar but an expert if you can find one. You will discover
that you will have quite a time locating your expert in each jurisdic-
tion. Thus it would take at least 96 lawyers to give you the law in
the United States on some one simple business proposition. judged by
any such simple problem, can we with fairness claim that our law in
the middle of the twentieth century is civilized, when we, trained
members of the bar that we are, cannot ascertain it for ourselves?
But these problems are primarily mechanical; industry would cure
them.
Our difficulties are more fundamental. Is it not made obvious to
us every day, as we pick up our newspaper, that we are living in a
world in which the predominant characteristic is politics, power poli-
tics, and that whether we turn south, east, or west its mood is revolu-
tionary? Revolutionary periods are not unknown in the history of
the common law. Mfore than once the common law has encountered
opposition, internal and external, and from each of such encounters
it has emerged from the fray stronger than ever. There are two
phases, however, of present-day problems that may well give us pause.
First, although the law is ever changing, controlling new economic,
political and social conditions, or being moulded by them, the pace of
social change- we may well call it the velocity of social change -
is today quite without precedent, as is the consequent strain on the
'law itself. The second significant fact is that in contradistinction to
other revolutionary periods in the history of the common law the
state of dissatisfaction on the one hand or of fear on the other is
now virtually world-wide. The revolutionary period of the Stuarts,
culminating in the Glorious Revolution of 1688, which meant much
for English and American liberty, was essentially a local phenomenon,
6
South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 2, Iss. 4 [1950], Art. 7
https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol2/iss4/7
RESPONSBILITY ov LAW ScHooL. 405
unaccompanied by similar movements elsewhere. The American
Revolution of 1776 had resulted by 1783 i. the independence of thir-
teen remote colonies before the French Revolution of 1789 broke
upon a startled worlu. In contrast we have been witnessing simul-
taneously the dismemberment of the British and Dutch empires in
Asia, civil war in China, Russian aggrandizement in Eastern Europe,
attempts at reconstruction in Western Europe, religious war in Pales-
tine, successive revolutions in South America, and in this country,
in the face of unparalleled industrial activity for several years, an
overwhelming amount of social unrest and fear.
As we reflect on this discouraging world scene, we will do well to
recall that freedom, as we Americans have known it, has existed for
less than two hundred years out of the five thousand years of recorded
history and in but a relatively small part of the inhabited globe. What
we have mistakenly fancied to be our birthright without obligation
on our part is plainly not the universal way of life. Indeed, there
are millions of human beings the world over, some from choice but
many more from fate, who doubt, however desirable our way of liv-
ing may seem, that it can be the normal lot of mankind. Nor are
the doubters all in foreign lands. We have had our princes of privi-
lege in the camps of both capital and labor; we have also had, to be
uncomfortably specific, our Huey Longs and our large city bosses,
our Earl Browders and our fellow travelers. Whatever others may
believe, we, who owe allegiance to the law, realize that without the
law we could not have liberty as we have known it and that without
our concept of liberty we could not have the law as we know it. We
know, too, that earlier crises for our law and liberty have been met
and mastered more than once by the leaders of our profession. Pro-
fessionally and historically, then, we have a special responsibility in
the present-day situation. Obviously, we must, first of all, in lawyer-
like fashion face the facts as to the actual operation of our system
of law today in the light of both national and world conditions. Then,
if defects appear as the result of our taking inventory, we must study
how the great judges, lawyers, and teachers of earlier times went
about the work of safeguarding their law and liberty by improving
the administration of justice. In this way we in our day and in our
own way may best hope to preserve our system of law and liberty,
which every right-thinking American treasures as one of his most
precious possessions.
The fundamental problem that confronts us is age-old. It arises
from the seeming inability of mankind to govern itself. The de-
sired goal has long been known to every stulent of the law, of history,
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and of politics. I have never seen it better phrased than it was by
Heraclitus of Ephesus twenty-five hundred years ago: "The major
problem of human society is to combine that degree of liberty with-
out which law is tyranny with that degree of law without which liberty
becomes license". We Americans thought we had gone far toward
solving the problem, but today we find ourselves confronted with it in
as aggravated a form as has ever perplexed mankind, with dangers
both internal and external.
In these days of complicated international relations, with a fading
hope for One World and a growing fear of Two Worlds, is not
a deep understanding of public law and government more important
for lawyers than ever before in the history of mankind? Should the
profession or the public generally be willing to leave these matters
either to the political scientists or to public officeholders? It will not
do to say that we can always find a few lawyers who know the answers.
The very suggestion points to the greatest default of the legal pro-
fession today - a lack of a sense of individual responsibility on the
part of every member of the bar for his position as a leader of public
opinion in his own community, be it a hamlet or city, county or state,
the nation or the world. It was personal influence of this sort that
built up the respect for law - "a government of laws and not of
men," if you please -that marked the golden age of the American
bar following the American Revolution. Just as great a responsibili-
ty, it is clear, rests on the individual members of the bar today. No
other group in society is, or at least should be, so well equipped to
lead or so responsible for leadership. It is a responsibility shared by
lawyers in all democracies, as a great English legal scholar, Sir
Maurice Sheldon Amos, so clearly pointed out to his fellow country-
men six years before World War II:
What we think, and write, and teach about the law is a matter
of practical importance, for the conceptions which gain ascen-
dency in the community as to the significance and the mission
of the law mould and inspire the actions of the legislator and
the judges. Upon the legal profession in each country there de-
volves then a responsibility, the due sense of which has for some
long time past been in abeyance, the responsibility for thinking
and advising the nation as a profession. This responsibility lies
less immediately upon the Courts, since they must "go with the
main body, not with the advance guard"; but it lies upon all those
who have a less immediate responsibility for the preservation of
the specious appearance of immutability, to con the chart, to de-
termine at frequent intervals our latitude and longitude, and to
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lay the course for the next port. We want far more information,
more statistics; for lawyers, like doctors, know too little of the
subsequent fate of the lives and concerns in which for a moment
they have intervened... in default of which there is some ground
for the fear that a justly impatient community will one day send
us all about our business.
No class in our society has been more generous with its time and
the use of its capacity for leadership in social enterprises than the
lawyers. They are always to be found in key positions on the boards
of colleges and hospitals and in the forefront of community drives.
But too many of the ablest of them have shrunk from public office-
holding, from party leadership, and from posts of influence in the
formation of public opinion and even from active participation in the
affairs of the organized bar. The reasons are known to all. First
of all, successful lawyers are very busy men; like all professional
men they render personal service and much of their work cannot
be delegated. Time is a most important element in their lives. Even
more controlling, the lawyer is subject to the same pressures to
escape his duties as a citizen as are all other men. His family is
likely to oppose his getting in what is often called a "dirty game".
They forget that it is only through politics that a democratic, repre-
sentative government can be run, and that it is the acts of the men
who run our government more than any others that determine whether
we shall have peace or war, prosperity or depression. The stakes
are high enough, it would seem, to merit anyone's attention. For-
tunately for our country, family and social aversion to participation
in public affairs disappears in the face of war. Then everybody
renders yeoman service. Even though in each war the military have
started by claiming that lawyers were worth "a dime a dozen", it
is significant that the value of their services was soon recognized
whenever the capacity for independent thinking was a requisite. But
why must patriotism always be thought of solely as a wartime virtue?
Is a war any less a war for being a cold war?
In earlier crises the common law has been saved by the genius of
a few men. It was Lord Coke, advocating in the House of Commons
the principles he had championed on the bench before he was sum-
marily dismissed as Chief Justice of England by James I for re-
fusing to submit to his command not to proceed with the hearing of
the case involving the King's prerogative-it was Lord Coke and
a few other Parliamentary leaders who saved the common law from
the reception of the Roman Law with its absolutistic ideas and who
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preserved the individual civil rights of English subjects and hence
of American citizens. The triumph of the Parliamentary forces was
due to his moral courage as much as to his vast knowledge of the law
and the justice of his cause. In admiration of his public service
we can well afford to forget some of his personal meanness. Can
there be any doubt that the example set by him and his Parliamen-
tary associates was a source of great inspiration to the revolutionary
patriots of America a century later? These constitutional gains of
Englishmen were crowned in the Glorious Revolution of 1688 by the
Bill of Rights and the Act of Settlement, which marked, among other
things, the achievement for the first time of the independence of the
judiciary.
In the period of the American Revolution, the French Revolution
and the English Industrial Revolution, a revolutionary era which
our age resembles more than any other except that ours is far greater
in intensity, the common law again was saved by the genius of a few
men - Mansfield on the King's Bench, Hardwicke and Eldon in
Chancery, Burke in the House of Commons, and Blackstone in his
studywriting the Commentaries, and in this country Marshall, Kent,
and Story. They were the leaders in adapting the law to the needs
of an entirely new age.
Today we are confronted in forty-eight different states and in the
Federal government with a crisis in the law greater than either of
those I have described. No longer do a few men have the authority
even had they the knowledge and wisdom on which to act. Clearly
our efforts must be cooperative and they must be nationwide in scope
with every state doing its part. We have had beginnings that point
the way in the uniform statutes drafted by the National Conference
of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, in the Restatements of
the American Law Institute, in the Rules of Civil and Criminal Pro-
cedure promulgated in the Federal courts, in the Judicial Councils
and in the Judicial Conferences which have been organized here and
there throughout the country and in the activities of our many bar
associations. Here we are confronted with tasks that preclude the
judges, many of whom are carrying staggering loads, from repeat-
ing the work of their great predecessors of a century and a half and
three centuries ago. Nor has the average practicing lawyer any more
leisure than the judges, if he is worth his salt. Obviously the leader-
ship in the great task of adapting the law to the needs of the latter
half of the twentieth century and of simplifying it in the process
must center in our law schools. I am not suggesting that all of the
work can or should be done by the law school faculties alone. They
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will have to call to their aid the wisest of our judges, the ablest of
our lawyers, the outstanding administrators, businessmen and labor
leaders. And every law school must be able to count on the coopera-
tion of every other school. I see no other available or potential
agencies to do the work that must be done if law and liberty are to be
preserved. Fortunately, some of our law schools are trying to recog-
nize their great responsibility and opportunity. The function of the
law schools of the second half of the twentieth century, as I envision
it, will be twofold. First, it will be responsible for training the law-
yers in the future With the enlarged and the enriched curriculum of
which I have spoken. Second, and equally important, they will also
have the primary duty of leadership in the restatement and simplifi-
cation of the entire body of the law and in so doing they will be giving
their teaching a realism and a vitality that it could in no other way
acquire. The task is a tremendous one. It is one that is crying to
be done, if our civilization is to be maintained in the form and mould
that every clear thinking lawyer would have it. Give our law schools
the men and the material, as you are doing here. Give them the en-
couragement and the cooperation to which they are entitled from the
bench, the bar, the government, industry and labor, and I have no
doubt that they will respond effectively and enthusiastically to the
greatest challenge that has ever come to American law or American
lawyers.
ARTHUR T. VAND4RBIrT.*
OA.B., 1910, A.M., 1912, Wesleyan University. LL.B., 1913, Columbia University. Re-
ciplent of many honorary degrees. Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of New Jersey.
One time President of the American Bar Association. Dean of the Law School of New
York University and practicing attorney.
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